what are factions according to madison and where does he write of them?
Introduction: A Madisonian Constitution for All
Past Michael Gerhardt and Jeffrey Rosen
The National Constitution Centre is pleased to present the work of our bipartisan Commission: A Madison Constitution for All. Launched on Freedom Day in 2017, the Commission has brought together constitutional scholars, historians, and commentators from various perspectives to explore what James Madison would remember of today'due south presidency, Congress, courts, and media, and how we can restore Madisonian values today. In the essays that follow, each of the eight scholars offer insightful analyses of the Madisonian Constitution, the developments that have undermined its objectives, and possible solutions for its resurrection.
The members of the Madison Commission concord on many significant themes – how Madison understood the objectives of the Constitution he helped to frame; how subsequent political, constitutional, and technological changes accept challenged Madison'southward assumptions and assumptions; and possible means to answer those challenges. And all eight scholars bespeak to the distinctive mechanisms Madison helped to fashion that were designed to protect against mob rule and promote deliberation on the public good. Amongst these were the following:
- The concept of federalism itself—having the federal and land governments bank check each other;
- Express responsibilities for the House of Representatives, the only aspect of the original constitutional system that allowed for direct election, and its dependence on the Senate to consummate almost any action the House decides to initiate;
- The pick processes originally designed for senators and presidents, which depended on cooling mechanisms placed between them and the voting public at big;
- The thought of having factions check each other in the legislative process as a way to foreclose whatever one of them from dominating the entire process;
- The proliferation of news outlets, which would help to brainwash the public about the well-nigh pressing bug of the day; and
- The concept of separation of powers, in which the branches of the federal government kept each other in check.
Our scholars likewise identify many bug undermining these various cooling mechanisms, which were designed to prevent factional tyranny and to promote careful, dispassionate deliberation on the public good. Commencement, there have been dramatic advancements in technology, spreading information at speeds unthinkable to the Framers, applied science that reinforces pre-existing views and allows people to avoid opinions different their own. Secondly, the rising and entrenchment of the 2-political party system has led to increased party polarization in Congress and across the residue of the federal government, including the presidency and the courts. Third, at that place accept been expansions (due in part to congressional acquiescence) in presidential domination of the federal system and the president's own obeisance to his party in lodge to maintain power. Finally, geographical sorting has resulted in people who live closer to people who reinforce their views and farther from those who practice not. These developments have helped to produce tape levels of voting in Congress strictly forth partisan lines, which has led in plow to the appointments of judges and justices who themselves end up voting at unprecedented levels along the party lines of the presidents who appointed them.
- Our Madisonian Constitution
At the age of 26, James Madison played a critical role arguing for a ramble convention to fix the issues with the Articles of Confederation. The Continental Congress had drafted the Articles of Confederation to serve equally the governing document that defined the powers of the fledgling regime of the Usa immediately afterwards it had declared its independence from Great United kingdom. Madison wrote one of the most all-encompassing, persuasive essays on the "defects" in the manufactures. In "Vices of the Political Organization of the The states," Madison surveyed twelve "defects" in the Articles of Confederation, including the absence of an contained executive to oversee the administration of the laws.[1] Other deficiencies included the absence of a supreme court and a weak federal Congress that lacked the means if not the volition to address social unrest, financial debt, and strange attack. Madison is credited with persuading George Washington to chair the Constitutional Convention.
In May 1787, Madison was one of the start delegates to arrive in Philadelphia for the Constitutional Convention. The previous year he had surveyed the history of failed democracies. He wrote to Thomas Jefferson, who missed the Constitutional Convention while serving equally America's representative in Paris, explaining that he was determined to assistance the convention avoid the fate of those "aboriginal and modern confederacies," which he thought had fallen prey to rule past demagogues and unruly mobs.[2] The colonists' experiences with the Articles of Confederation convinced Madison that the new country needed a strong national regime, which he proposed to the Convention in the form of the Virginia Program. His reading farther convinced him that direct democracies – in which citizens made all the of import decisions past majority vote – were destined to fail, considering they were vulnerable to the public'south uncontrollable passions.[3] In The Federalist Papers, written after the Constitution had been drafted, Madison argued, "In all very numerous assemblies, of any characters composed, passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason."[4] While the city-country Athens was renowned equally a pure democracy, in which half dozen,000 of its citizens were required for a quorum, Madison believed that Athens' commonwealth was destined to fail: "Had every Athenian denizen been a Socrates, every Athenian associates would still have been a mob."[5] In 1787, the Continental Congress stood past helplessly, doing nothing, equally populist rage in Massachusetts led to Shay'southward Rebellion, in which debt-ridden farmers revolted against the local governments controlled by their creditors.
Madison was far from lonely in thinking that the new Constitution had to be framed in ways that guarded against impetuous mobs. In Federalist 10, he defined factions as groups "united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of involvement, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the customs."[6] Both he and Alexander Hamilton, the author who wrote virtually of the essays in The Federalist Papers, believed that factions arose when public opinion formed too rapidly and spread only as fast. But, Madison and Hamilton believed that factions could exist checked if the public took the fourth dimension to consider the long-term concerns rather than curt-term gratification.
The Framers designed the Constitution to prevent factions from threatening private liberty and making policy on the ground of cocky-interest rather than the public adept. They gave the public no direct command over any part of the federal authorities. They distrusted direct republic, which they believed would atomic number 82 to mob rule, and therefore designed the American Constitution as a representative republic, in which the aware people chosen to run the authorities would serve the public expert. The Framers likewise designed the Constitution with a series of cooling mechanisms to preclude intemperate controlling. Nether the new Constitution, the public directly elected only one chamber of the Congress, the House of Representatives, but the House did not accept concluding say over anything (except for its own internal governance). The lawmaking process too required the Senate's consent, as well as either the president'due south signature or a supermajority of both Houses of Congress. Every state had equal representation in the Senate, whose members would exist chosen past state legislatures rather than direct ballot by the people. The president was chosen past electors rather than straight election past the people. The distribution of powers among the branches was designed to ensure that no single branch could accumulate too much power. The further partition of ability between the federal regime and state governments would ensure that none of the iii branches of the federal government could e'er claim to solely represent the people. They all did in some style, but each of the three branches kept the others in check.
Although many believed that democracy could non succeed in such a large country, Madison thought it was a good matter that the U.s. was destined to occupy a huge expanse of territory and therefore to be a large democracy, not a modest one, which could easily be taken over past a passionate faction. He explained, "Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; y'all make it less probable that a majority of the whole will accept a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such common motive exists, it will be more than difficult for all who feel information technology to discover their own strength, and to human activity in unison with each other."[vii] Madison hoped that the large expanse of the U.s. and its sizeable population would make it hard if non incommunicable for a passionate mob to take control of the entirety of the republic; the passions would probable defuse over time and space. Madison and Hamilton expected farther among the nigh of import safeguards against factional tyranny would be the "circulation of newspapers through the unabridged body of the people."[8] Newspapers were almost all partisan in their orientation, but they were also the likeliest sources for the educated elite to express erudite opinions on the bug of the mean solar day. Through such publications, the public could exist improve informed about what they needed to know in lodge to become useful and responsible citizens.
Madison's contributions to shaping the drafting and ratification of the Constitution did not end with his service as a delegate to the Ramble Convention. In his remarkable three decades of public service, Madison occupied several different positions in the federal government and participated in a number of momentous events in ramble history. 3 of these had especially noteworthy ramifications for American democracy; they are equally important for understanding his contributions to the Constitution as his service as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention and as one of the anonymous authors of the Federalist Papers, which helped to secure public support for ratification.
The first occurred soon after he became a fellow member of the House of Representatives. In the Constitutional Convention, Madison had joined with a majority of the other Framers to oppose adding a bill of rights to the new Constitution. They thought a specific set of liberties protected from the federal regime was unnecessary as long as the federal regime had no express powers over such interests. However, Anti-Federalists opposed ratifying the Constitution in part because it lacked a bill of rights. They feared that unless the Constitution specified the set of individual liberties that the federal government could not abbreviate, the government might claim an unwarranted the power to threaten those liberties. Five states that ratified the Constitution included a list of amendments they wanted to include. In his outset entrada for a seat in House – a race against James Monroe, an Anti-Federalist – Madison changed his mind on the necessity for a nib of rights and vowed he would fight for it if elected. Though the Business firm blocked his first attempts to innovate a proposed pecker of rights, Madison eventually secured the floor of the House on June viii, 1789. In that location he delivered a long speech explaining "my reasons why I call up it proper to suggest amendments, and state the amendments."[9] He argued that considering his proposed amendments would permit for an of import debate among those who ratified the Constitution and those who resisted considering of fears of "aristocracy or despotism." Madison argued that:
It volition be a desirable thing to extinguish from the bust of every member of the community, any apprehensions that there are those amongst his countrymen who wish to deprive them of the freedom for which they valiantly fought and honorably bled. And if there are amendments desired of such a nature as will not injure the constitution, and they tin can be ingrafted so as to give satisfaction to the doubting part of our beau-citizens, the friends of the Federal Government volition evince that spirit of deference and concession for which they take hitherto distinguished . . . among whom are many respectable for their talents and patriotism, and respectable for the jealousy they have for their liberty, which, though mistaken in object, is honorable in its motive.[x]
He reminded the members of the House that, "There is a dandy trunk of the people falling under this description, who now feel much inclined to join their support to the cause of Federalism, if they were satisfied on i signal. Nosotros ought not to disregard their inclination, but, on principles of amity and moderation, conform to their wishes and expressly declare the great rights of mankind secured nether the constitution."[11] Though Madison believed a bill of rights was unnecessary or even dangerous, he argued that the republican values on which the land and its Constitution had been founded demanded respect for the arguments and rights of other true-blue, well-meaning citizens. In championing a bill of rights, he placed the interests of the republic over his ain personal interests. The House, and later the Senate, agreed to send a dozen of the 19 amendments Madison proposed to the states. And over the course of the next two years, the states ratified x of those amendments—the Bill of Rights we know today.
After, as president from 1809 until 1817, Madison once again placed the public good over his own personal interests and beliefs. The event on this occasion was the constitutionality of a national bank, which Alexander Hamilton as the nation'southward beginning Treasury Secretary had conceived every bit a repository for federal funds and every bit the federal government's fiscal agent in raising money to pay off the nation's revolutionary war debts and in establishing and maintaining a national currency. As a fellow member of the Firm, Madison had opposed the creation of a national banking concern as unconstitutional. He rejected Hamilton'southward claim that the Constitution granted "implied powers" to Congress to incorporate entities such as banks. Like Jefferson, he feared the depository financial institution was predicated on a dangerous theory of ramble interpretation that did not confine Congress to its express powers and those that were admittedly essential to its exercise of its enumerated government. But, Madison and Jefferson failed to dissuade President George Washington from agreeing with Hamilton, and the Beginning Banking concern began its operations in 1791, the aforementioned year equally the Pecker of Rights was ratified.
Following a narrow vote in Congress, the banking concern's charter lapsed in 1811. The next year, war bankrupt out with Great United kingdom. The nation's finances chop-chop deteriorated every bit other nations pulled their capital out of the U.s.a. and the federal government was forced to rely on loans from the National Banking concern for its war funding. In 1814, Madison reluctantly agreed with his Treasury Secretary Alexander Dallas on the necessity for re-chartering the bank; but he withdrew his back up once peace negotiations began in late 1814 and the imperative to secure loans to finance the war dissipated. However, the economic system took a downturn in 1815, and the federal government could no longer rely on land banks to take upwards the slack left by a weakened national bank to reinvigorate the national economy. Dallas persuaded Madison to rethink his position on the National Bank, and in 1816 he signed the twenty-yr charter that established the Second Bank of the United states. Afterward leaving the presidency, Madison explained that, while he believed that the Starting time Depository financial institution lacked a constitutional basis at its showtime, its ramble legitimacy grew over time through political acceptance: "It had been carried into execution through a menstruation of twenty years, with annual recognition . . . and with the entire acquiescence of all the local regime, besides as of the nation at big."[12]
Madison'south shift of position on the constitutionality of the national bank was a prime example of Madison's following the path he had laid out in The Federalist Papers for settling a question of constitutional meaning. In Federalist 37, he wrote, "All new laws . . . are considered equally more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a serial of item discussions and adjudications."[13] In Madison's judgment, the constitutionality of the national bank had been properly "liquidated," or fixed through a series of presidential and congressional actions.
In the time between Madison's advocacy for a nib of rights and authorization of the chartering of the Second National Banking company, Madison joined Jefferson in making another decision with significant ramifications for the future of the democracy. In Federalist x, Madison had warned that, "The latent causes of faction are . . . sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into unlike degrees of activity, co-ordinate to the different circumstances of civil society."[14] He suggested that, "The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the regime."[15] He expected that the powers of factions could exist diluted past bringing them into the regime then having them check each other. But past 1791, Madison had changed his heed and joined Jefferson in establishing the Democratic-Republican Party in opposition to the policies of the Washington administration, especially its assumption of states' debts accrued during the Revolutionary War and the institution of a national banking organization embodied in the creation of the First National Bank. In 1792, Madison acknowledged that, "in every political gild, parties are unavoidable," that they were "the language of reason" and through their proliferation spread the spirit of "republicanism," and that parties should be made to exist "mutual checks on each other."[sixteen] Four years afterward, President Washington warned in his Farewell Address that factions in the course of political parties could rip the state apart. He alleged, "I have already intimated to you lot the danger of Parties in the State, with item reference to the founding of them on Geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more than comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn way confronting the baneful effects of the Spirit of Party, generally."[17]
President Washington's alarm fell largely on deafened ears. Once it took root, the 2-party arrangement has become increasingly entrenched in the The states, both at the national and state or local levels. The Democratic-Republican Party won a string of significant victories at the national level, with twenty-iv straight years of control of the White Firm from Thomas Jefferson through James Monroe. The Jeffersonians also collection the Federalist Party, which had put John Adams into the White Business firm for a single term, out of existence. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the Democratic-Republican Party transformed into the mod Autonomous Political party, while the opposing party took unlike names and shapes, offset with the Whig Party in the 1830s and 1840s and eventually calling itself the Republican Party –whose candidate Abraham Lincoln won the presidency in 1860. Since later the Ceremonious War, the two major parties of the Democrats and the Republicans accept consistently dominated national politics and, in doing and so, challenged the foundations of the Constitution that Madison helped to frame.
- Challenges to the Madisonian Constitution
Equally members of the Madisonian Commission argue in the essays that follow, the Madisonian Constitution rested on several assumptions. Among these were the Framers' expectations nearly who, or what item kinds of people, would lead the different branches of the federal regime. In the Virginia ratifying convention, Madison explained that, "I go on the not bad republican principle, that the people with virtue and intelligence to select men [sic] of virtue and wisdom. Is there no virtue among us? If there non be, nosotros are in a wretched state of affairs. No theoretical checks – no grade of regime tin can render us secure."[18] The expectation was that at that place would be virtuous individuals who could "render" the nation "secure" confronting mob rule and all the destruction that came with it.[19]
Closely linked to its objective of ensuring the correct kinds of people led each branch, the Madisonian Constitution was concerned with how people got into part. Madison and the other Framers who championed the Constitution had high expectations for the mechanisms set forth within it for selecting national leaders: directly, pop elections for the Firm; country legislatures for choosing senators; and presidents who were selected through the Balloter College and whose department heads or cabinet was to be chosen through requirements for presidential nominations and Senate confirmation. The Madisonian Constitution was further concerned with what people did one time they got into function. Time and again, Madison stressed that the right kinds of people, once in office, would be inclined to focus on the public expert and not just their own parochial, provincial, or personal interests.
As the Madisonian Commission convened for a workshop at the National Constitution Centre in Philadelphia final November, our eight scholars identified a number of factors, individually or in combination, which complicated or impeded the Constitution's objectives afterward ratification. The most important objective was that elections bring into government the correct kinds of people who would exist focused on the public good. One obvious claiming to this objective was the rise and entrenchment of the ii-political party organization. Madison understood that political parties could be dominated by or comprised of factions; once entrenched, those parties – or factions –would likely be tending to nominate as candidates for the presidency or Congress people who are beholden or responsive to particular factions, non the general good of the public. Yet, Madison'south expectation that the parties could keep themselves in check was largely borne out over the first several decades of the republic. In the 1820s and 1830s, the commencement political parties actually helped to constrain and temper impassioned or extreme impulses among the electorate by providing institutional frameworks that allowed for the unification of diverse economic and regional interests through shared, wide reaching constitutional visions. Every bit Princeton historian Sean Wilentz has noted, the most serious movements for ramble and social change in the nineteenth century – from the abolition of slavery to the Progressive motility – were the products of strong and diverse political parties. To be sure, these movements did not come to fruition without significant outbreaks of violence and mayhem. However, the political parties attempted, although with merely varied success, to defuse and to aqueduct into effective constitutional and political dialogue.
Whatever moderating furnishings political parties might have had in the aftermath of the Civil War were short-lived. In the twentieth century, those effects were ameliorated through a series of populist reforms, including the directly election of senators through the Seventeenth Amendment, the populist-ballot initiative, and direct primaries in presidential elections, which became widespread in the 1970s. More recently, geographical and political self-sorting have produced factions of voters who select representatives who are willing to support the party-line at all costs. Parties, in short, accept expanded their control over both who is chosen for the highest federal offices and how they govern.
Equally of today, electoral primaries conflate the correct kinds of people for office with those who will serve the interests of faction. General elections announced to offer no more than a selection between the representatives of two factions, non necessarily a representative cantankerous-section of the citizenry. Once in office, presidents discover themselves almost immediately pressured to focus on their re-elections, which means pleasing the people who put them into office. Every bit a effect, presidents feel pressure to choose as their closest advisors or cabinet heads non the people who are most qualified or disposed to be concerned with the public good, just rather with keeping detail factions inside the governing party happy.
For House members, direct ballot every two years intensifies their attachment to party or to the factions they must appease to exist re-nominated by their parties and to stay in office. In one of his last public appearances, the late Justice Antonin Scalia suggested that the Seventeenth Amendment had transformed the Senate past altering the means for its ballot from land legislatures to direct ballot in their corresponding states. This transformation made senators more amenable to appeasing well-financed factions to ensure their continued nomination and election. As a issue, the full general elections for Senate, perhaps like those for the presidency and the House, at present give voters a pick between the representatives of two factions. In one case in office, Firm members and senators need party support more than e'er to maintain their committee assignments and mountain successful re-election campaigns. As a consequence, members of Congress have been increasingly tending to conflate their own interests with those of their parties rather than serving the public good. Over the last few decades, this disposition is conspicuously reflected in the sharp increases in voting in Congress strictly forth party lines. For instance, the defining congressional achievements of Barack Obama'due south presidency and, thus far, Donald Trump'south presidency—the Affordable Care Act of 2010 and the Tax Cuts and Job Acts of 2017, respectively—were each passed with no votes from members of the minority party.
The ascension in rigid partisanship has not been unique to the Congress. For example, the Electoral College, once thought to be a filter that allowed electors to make wise choices about who should become president, has largely failed in that mission as it barbarous under the command of the increasingly dominant political parties. In one case in function, presidents, at least since Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, accept insisted that their authorization derives straight from the people. Theodore Roosevelt referred to his office as "a bully pulpit," past which he meant a unique platform for advocating for his agenda straight to the American people. He farther argued that the President functioned uniquely as a "steward" doing whatever he could for the American people and express but by his pop support rather than whatever of the literal constraints fix forth in the Constitution.[twenty] Since the early on twentieth century, presidents have moved in precisely the direction that Madison and the other Framers had hoped to avoid: They bypass Congress and the media to brand emotional appeals directly to the American people.
Both the ramble structure and the increasingly sharp partisan divide amongst the members of Congress and the American electorate have helped to make the presidency stronger. Concerned that Congress had the potential to become the most dangerous branch considering of its potential to draw ability into its "impetuous vortex," Madison and the other Framers designed a constitution that makes lawmaking difficult.[21] The lawmaking procedure set forth in the Constitution is riddled with veto-gates or various points at which a bill may be impeded or precluded from becoming a law. The showtime step in the code process is to go a police approved in one bedroom of Congress. But near efforts fall brusk, ofttimes before a pecker can reach the floor. If a nib makes information technology to the floor, it may not receive a vote or a majority. If the bill is approved in one chamber, it must be canonical in the other. Even after a constabulary is passed by both chambers of Congress, information technology must be signed by the president or at that place must be at least two-thirds of each chamber like-minded to override a presidential veto. After that, the law still may be subject to judicial review along with possible complications in its implementation or its structure. In brusk, the Constitution provides many more chances for a police force to fail than for it to prevail.
Though the Framers largely expected the executive and legislative branches to be on equal basis in the lawmaking process (or in the three areas in which the Senate has unilateral judgment[22]), information technology has not worked out that manner. Over time, it has become apparent that, as a lawmaker, the president, not Congress, has the upper hand. If for whatever reason Congress is unable to legislate on a matter, its inactivity leaves a void that president tin can, and oft do, move chop-chop to fill, achieving past executive fiat what he is unable to accomplish by legislation. Once the president has made his move by issuing an executive gild or vetoing a bill, so Congress is highly unlikely to override what he has done. Although President Obama vetoed congressional enactments xx times, Congress overrode only 1 of those vetoes, demonstrating the high threshold that the Constitution establishes for overriding presidential vetoes. Thus, even if Congress can deed first on a matter, there is no guarantee that the will of Congress, every bit opposed to that of the president, will prevail.
The expanded power of political parties over the choices and activities of the leaders of the three branches has coincided with the erosion of other safeguards that Madison and other Framers had designed to create some altitude betwixt national leaders and popular majorities. I of the most of import of these mechanisms is separation of powers. In Federalist 47, Madison contended that the aggregating of legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the hands of i body or person would be "the very definition of tyranny."[23] In Federalist 51, he explained that "appetite must exist made to counteract ambition" past "giving to those who administer each department, the necessary ramble ways, and personal motives, to resist encroachments from the others."[24] He counterbalanced his business concern for the potential aggregation of powers with the observation that the practicalities of governance dictate that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers are non entirely separated, but rather composite. The separation of powers is not accented, but "where the whole power of i section is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another section, the fundamental principles of a costless constitution are subverted."[25] Madison was largely concerned with the ability of each branch of government to check encroachments on its own powers by the others. Concerns about a possible breakup in separation of powers might arise when a single faction controlled all three branches.
Whatsoever regime does, the public is rarely given unfiltered news about it. Today, the filtering bias of media and other outlooks is far worse than it has been before, but it is not unprecedented. In Madison's twenty-four hour period, there were partisan newspapers rallying their respective bases and spreading opposition to the leaders and policies they did non like. Today, there are far more outlets that feed political prejudices. With countless news outlets to choose from, near people learn their facts from sources that align with their political and social views. That is non the kind of education Madison expected to help democracy thrive.
- The Essays of the Madisonian Commission
In the eight essays that follow, members of the Madison Commission examine what James Madison would have made of our current presidency, Congress, courts, and media, and what we can do to resurrect Madisonian values of reason rather than passion in a polarized age.
In "From a Fixed, Limited Presidency to a Living, Flexible, Dizzying Presidency," Sai Prakash, of the University of Virginia Police force School traces the evolution of the modernistic presidency. "Virtually every decision within the Convention tilted towards an energetic executive,"[26] Prakash argues. On his reading, George Washington and other delegates resisted the trend in the colonies to create a relatively weak executive considering of their fears of the British monarchy and royal governors. Designed to be energetic, independent, and effective, the presidency designed past the Framers had obvious limits, such as the requirements that presidents "had to execute the laws of Congress." They also "had to honour congressional regulation of the army and navy," and needed "consent of the Senate to make appointments and treaties"; they "depended upon Congress to create and fund executive offices and departments"; they "had to honour judicial judgments"; and they were obliged by adjuration to "'preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.'"[27] In the years after ratification, presidents expanded their powers to initiate and manage wars and to forge international agreements past means other than treaties. At the aforementioned time, Prakash argues, "Modernistic presidents accept become less and less faithful executives. They are more prone to becoming lawmakers every bit they supplement, misconstrue, and flout" the laws made by Congress.[28] Prakash suggests that presidents take been able to blot increased power over lawmaking considering they have been able to take advantage of other factors: the "unity" in the executive co-operative, which enables the president to motion more quickly and decisively than either of the other two branches; the "technical rules" limiting the extent to which judicial review can meaningful cabin the growth of executive ability; and diverse changes in "conceptions of the office and transformations of club," including presidents' declarations of popular mandates to justify their claims of further power.[29]
Prakash suggests that those who view the growth of presidential ability as more than of a problem than a approving can consider several possible fixes. Members of Congress tin can be "more willing to limited their views on matters of constitutional import"; Congress could likewise create "a war powers act that cuts military spending upon the initiation of conflict"; and it could "adopt a strategy of grow and shrink," "reduce delegations," and "reexamine the offices that currently crave advice and consent and do abroad with the obligation for those junior offices where such consent seems a waste material of fourth dimension."[30] While Prakash acknowledges that these solutions are imperfect, he concludes that at least "nosotros tin can certainly expect more from" Congress "than we can from presidents who spoke of the regal pretensions of the incumbent while running for the office."[31]
In "The Constitution, the Presidency, and Partisan Democracy: Congress Revises the Electoral Higher, 1803-1804," Sean Wilentz of Princeton examines how political developments later on ratification undermined the Madisonian Constitution by transforming the operations of the Balloter College and the 12th Amendment. He examines the origins of the Electoral College, which was designed to ensure that contained, enlightened men would make the terminal choices on who would be president, noting how "speedily after 1787 the Framers' system [for selecting the president] gave style to partisan conflict, necessitating an of import alter in the Constitution [the Twelfth Amendment] less than a generation afterwards the Constitution was ratified."[32] Wilentz rejects the argument that the Electoral College was devised as a means to protect slavery, but sees information technology instead equally a last-minute compromise to ensure that there would not be direct election of the president. The Framers provided that land legislatures would choose electors. But, Wilentz argues, "The political history of the Twelfth Subpoena reveals how quickly the Framers' consensual conception of national politics proved inadequate to the realities of their ain time. It illuminates how a very different formulation of politics, rooted in partisanship and party organization fitfully supplanted what the Framers had originally envisaged" as the purpose of the Electoral Higher to safeguard confronting the mob'due south choosing a president.[33] Partisan fighting made it incommunicable for the ideal of the Balloter College ever to be fully realized, and in the backwash of the hotly contested presidential election of 1800, it needed fixing. The set was the Twelfth Subpoena, which was ratified in 1804 merely non without considerable partisan grouse over its terms and implantation. Over the side by side few decades immediately after its ratification, partisan politics ensured that the Twelfth Amendment, in Wilentz'due south view, "pushed the nation'due south politics closer to the partisan majoritarianism that defined Jacksonian democracy" or what has become known every bit majoritarian rule.[34]
In "Revisiting and Restoring Madison's American Congress," Sarah Binder of George Washington University examines Madison's view of Congress and considers whether and how the Congress Madison had envisioned could exist restored. She emphasizes "two elements of Article I [that] are particularly important for distilling Madison's programme for the new Congress."[35] The showtime is Madison's hope "that his constitutional system would channel lawmakers' ambitions, creating incentives for to remain responsive to the broad political interests that sent them to Congress in the commencement place.."[36] The second was his expectation "that Congress would dominate the political system."[37] Even so, Binder argues, the story of how these elements played out is more than circuitous than usually supposed. On the i paw, "Madison's congressional vision was a stunning success."[38] Binder argues that Congress, commonly supposed to exist bailiwick to gridlock, in fact "has played a preeminent part in driving and shaping historical change in the U.S., and it remains the earth'southward longest lasting, popularly elected legislature."[39] On the other mitt, she acknowledges that the two party system may well accept cleaved Congress, as it has produced "steadily ascension legislative stalemate, limited oversight of the executive, lack of fiscal bailiwick, and excessive delegation to the executive and ofttimes the courts."[40] Congress has failed "for some time to incubate, deliberate, and compromise on legislative solutions to major public programs," she concludes, emphasizing "the degree of legislative deadlock in each Congress since the mid-1940s."[41]
Every bit for causes of this gridlock, Binder identifies party polarization. She also notes that "presidential subordination to Congress weakened with the ascension of nationalized parties with presidents at the captain."[42] The president become even stronger as Congress (oftentimes for partisan reasons) delegated more authority to the executive. Congress may have thought it could recapture the power it surrendered, but parties have not been able to muster the super-majorities necessary to overcome presidential vetoes of whatever efforts past Congress to recapture its lost authority. "Even if lawmakers ultimately discover a style to get their establishment back on track," Binder concludes, "Congress' difficulties have been costly—both to the fiscal health of the country and to citizens' trust in government. The economy is regaining its footing, but regenerating public support for a Congress that barely reflects Madison's ideal will probable evidence much harder."[43]
In "Recovering a Madisonian Congress," Daniel Stid, Director of the Madison Initiative at the Hewlett Foundation, asks how we tin can restore "some of the powers [that Congress] ceded the executive?"[44] Stid reviews the diverse mechanisms that the Constitution designed to curb factional tyranny and to promote skilful government. Congress was essential to the Madisonian system, since it would "host and foster deliberation on what the federal regime should do almost important issues facing the nation" and would exist non just "a check on executive power" but besides become "the generative, law-making body in the new republican organisation of government."[45] Co-ordinate to Madison's vision, "It was but in Congress that the full sweep of ideas, agendas, interests and passions could be represented and reconciled, and information technology was only in Congress that the legislative alloys in which they would exist combined could exist forged and tempered."[46] But, Stid recognizes that the "mischiefs of factions" have been "spiraling out of control" in Congress for many reasons, including the precipitous rising in the political parties' determination non just to go and keep power, but also non to cooperate with each other, as well equally the presidency's arrogation of power, and the abdication of congressional authority considering of partisan and other reasons.[47]
Stid identifies "three potential paths forrad" that could assist to restore Congress as Madison had conceived of it.[48] First, we could "mitigate[e] the furnishings of factions, in particular polarization and hyper-partisanship, that too often work to inflame passions and grind things in Congress to a halt."[49] "Ranked choice voting," for example, could requite "voters more choices and provides a effectively-grained register of public opinion, ensures winning candidates are supported by a majority of voters, and – most chiefly – gives candidates incentives to forego highly negative and partisan campaigns."[l] Second, we could strengthen "Congress as an institution in our separation of powers organization," a solution that requires "procedural entrepreneurs" in Congress that are more than interested in policy initiatives than partisan fidelity.[51] Third, citizens could "revitalize our understanding of the proper functioning of Congress and do our part to ensure that our representatives and senators reflect this agreement."[52] Ramble education, in brusque, must exist undertaken to effect "reawakened citizen engagement with Congress."[53]
So there are the courts. In "James Madison and the Judicial Power," Jack Rakove of Stanford examines Madison'due south thinking about the legislative procedure and the Supreme Court'south function "in maintaining the stability of the entire federal system."[54] Madison believed that the representation of unlike factions within Congress would aid to dilute the power of whatever one; and their clashes in Congress, in the long run, would promote deliberation and compromise. He further hoped that the judiciary would be part of a quango of revision that would continue both states and the Congress in check. When the Convention rejected his suggestions, Congress and the courts were left as the safeguards against the tyranny of factions. Madison hoped that experienced legislators in Congress would learn knowledge nigh the public practiced. Merely experienced legislators proved elusive: as Rakove writes: "Even though the Constitution did not crave it, rotation in office remained the pervasive do until the belatedly nineteenth century."[55] "Indeed," he writes, "zilch ameliorate indicates how much our political world differs from theirs than this basic disparity in the importance of incumbency."[56] Rakove concludes past wondering whether adopting "Madison'southward council of revision," with judges as members, "would reduce and mitigate the constitutional storms that sometimes rage over legislation, as the post-enactment history of the Affordable Intendance Act illustrates so amply exemplifies."[57]
In "The Irrelevance and Relevance of James Madison to Faithful Constitutional Estimation," Michael Paulsen of St. Thomas Police force School addresses a different question most the American judiciary: the widespread consensus on the "sectional discretion and judgment of courts, to be exercised in accordance with whatever criteria judges think are most appropriate."[58] He argues that the consensus on both judicial supremacy and broad interpretive discretion of judges over constitutional estimation are wrong. Madison himself understood the role of the judiciary differently. Paulsen argues that the Framers did not believe in judicial supremacy, only rather that in a system of separation of powers with "no one branch possessing interpretive supremacy or superiority over the others; none beingness bound by the constitutional judgments of the others; and each using its powers independently to check the others, in society to concur all accountable and go on the Constitution secure."[59]
On the question of ramble interpretation, Paulsen notes that Madison and the other Framers did not envision authoritative interpreters engaging in a free-for-all in picking and choosing methodologies for interpreting the Constitution. Instead, Madison viewed the Constitution as having, on about matters, a fixed, static, determinate pregnant. That pregnant consisted of the common linguistic meaning of the words of the document (or, in some cases, the specialized meaning of a well-recognized term-of-fine art phrase): that is, "the meaning the Constitution'south words and phrases would have had to those using them at the time the Constitution was adopted."[sixty] Paulsen quotes with approval Madison'south proclamation as a member of the House that, "As the instrument came from [the people,] [the Constitution] was nil more than than the typhoon of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity was breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the several State Conventions."[61] For the terms of the Constitution that "had an uncertain or indefinite meaning, fairly admitting of a range of plausible readings . . . Madison believed that a long, consequent and broadly accepted interpretation and practice might, over time, settle the understanding of such uncertain terms or phrases as a practical matter."[62] While Paulsen concedes that "Madison was not perfectly consequent over time in his constitutional views over the course of his long public career," he concludes that "he rarely if ever deviated from first principles as to what properly counts—and, every bit important, what does not—in sound constitutional estimation."[63] Paulsen concludes past writing, "Information technology is merely a small-scale exaggeration to say that the loss of the Madisonian vision — and the substitution in its place of a practise nether which the Supreme Court possesses essentially plenary and sectional interpretive ability, exercised according to any criteria the members of the Court think fit — accounts for nearly everything that ails our constitutional law today," and therefore, "restoring a 'Madisonian Constitution' for today is a reclamation project as information technology concerns the judicial power."[64]
Finally, there is the media. In "Madison's Deliberative Republicanism, Political Communication, & the Sovereignty of Public Opinion," Colleen Sheehan of Villanova, shifts our focus toward Madison'southward vision of "deliberative Republicanism" and how advancements in advice undermine Madison's understanding of the place of public opinion at the federal level. The Madisonian Constitution sought non just to enable factions to proceed each in bank check but also to ensure that representatives focused on the public good. As Sheehan describes the project, "To guard against personal ambition and the threat of governmental tyranny (i.e., minority faction), Madison endorsed a system of prudential devices, including institutional separation of powers, bicameralism, checks and balances, and federalism."[65] These "inventions of prudence" are intended to "channel, bank check, and control the cocky-seeking personal motives of political office holders and thereby enable government to law itself."[66] But, for Madison, "The primary command on the authorities . . . remains always with the people. In the final analysis, governmental decisions depend on the will of the society, or in other words, on the will of the bulk."[67] While Madison recognized that factions might discover ways to communicate and shape the views of their respective members, he helped to devise a system whose "overall aim was not to stymie the volition of the majority, merely rather to place obstacles in the path of factions, including bulk faction. At the same fourth dimension, he sought to facilitate the evolution of a just lodge, or in other words, the reason of the public."[68]
To promote public reason, Sheehan argues, Madison's "goal . . . was to encourage the type of chatty activity that involves deliberation and results in the measured exchange of ideas about public matters."[69] His ultimate aim, Sheehan maintains, was "to establish the atmospheric condition in which a certain kind of bulk can conceivably form and rule."[seventy] That ideal majority would be as large as humanly possible and would exist informed and abide past "the settled opinion of the community."[71] As Sheehan explains further, "Once formed and settled, public stance is the operational sovereign in free authorities."[72] Public stance itself, if properly informed and shaped, becomes the platonic educator for the people. Sheehan acknowledges many problems have eroded the weather that take eroded the creation of an informed, virtuous citizenry. These include the rise of "political partisanship" that has effectively "split" the state into 2 camps—"those who defend the Constitution and the principles of the Founding, including the idea of natural law and natural rights" and those who "favor . . . evolving, inclusive egalitarianism, or its postmodern variant, which rejects natural police force and the notion of man nature itself, in favor of social constructs, hierarchies of power, and identity politics."[73] Sheehan associates herself with the old camp, which she besides considers to marshal with Madison's "aspirations for America [which] depended on the capacity of the people to govern themselves, which in plough depended on the willingness of the people to engage in deliberative processes which aim to – and in the spirit of – finding mutual ground."[74]
In the last essay, "'The Ultimate Justice of the People:' Madison, Public Stance, and the Internet Age," Greg Weiner of Assumption Higher examines Madison's central assumptions nearly space and fourth dimension in his formulation of how public opinion would ideally form under the new Constitution. 1 assumption was that there would a spatial, or physical, separation between the public and their representatives in Congress, and some other was that "public opinion would be sovereign, simply it would form gradually."[75] Madison's scheme, as set along in the Constitution, which Weiner, calls "temporal republicanism," was designed "to separate the formation of public opinion from the decision to human action upon it with sufficient time for passions to dissipate."[76] According to Weiner, Madison expected that one time in Congress, members would make "a rational calculation . . . to put long-term interests over immediate appetites.[77] And Madison's assay of faction is rooted in moral objectivity. This is not to say anybody agrees on what is correct, simply Madison did appear to assume everyone operated in roughly the same universe of facts even if those facts yielded different conclusions.
Thus, Madison's hope that the public and Congress would engage in careful deliberation on the big questions of the twenty-four hours depended on relying on the cooling mechanisms of time and space to prevent citizens from interim immediately upon their passions. Instead, through interaction with people of differing views, they could thoughtfully debate the public good. Merely, as Weiner argues, "All of these assumptions are in tension with a media and technological surround that has accelerated communication and the formation of public opinion, erased the constitutional distance betwixt representatives and constituents and between constituents and each other, [and] hardened factional alignments every bit consumers of media on all sides retreat into private and self-reinforcing realities."[78] Every bit a nation, we have, in other words, become not bigger merely smaller, and more fragmented, a nation that is comprised of relatively isolated communities which are resistant to new or challenging data and, therefore, to cooperative deliberation in both the brusk- and long-term. The "effect of this division is to allow media consumers to live in worlds of their own making, increasingly isolated from opposing views."[79] This state of diplomacy is incapable of cultivating the kind of public reason which Madison hoped would guide the lawmaking process. His "particular concept of reason entailed the awarding of open up minds to objective facts. If minds are never open up, and facts are always fungible, Madisonian reason cannot operate. If all this is communicated at the speed of light, neither can Madison'due south device for dissipating the passions."[eighty] Similar several other authors, Weiner concludes by emphasizing the importance of borough didactics.
- Solutions
Equally all contributors to the Madisonian Constitution for All Essay Series recognize, there are at least three kinds of solutions to the issues identified by the Madisonian Constitution. The beginning is to set the extent to which websites and social media platforms take undermined public deliberation and discourse. Proposals for fixing these problems include: greater transparency, delaying publication of various kinds of content, or reducing the corporeality of some content available online. These and other proposed solutions run across two bug. The first is that the platforms themselves are individual entities and, therefore, the solutions for improving what they do with respect to how they regulate content online must come up from them, and not from the state or the public (unless, of course, the public tin exercise influence over what they do through the market or regulation). The companies running the platforms must have the incentives to modify. An ensuing complication or salvation, depending on your point of view is, of course, the First Amendment, which forbids the government from censoring hate spoken communication or attempting to micro-manage the deliberations and discussions across the web—and these companies have their own First Amendments correct to assert.
A 2nd solution to the breaking downward of the Madisonian Constitution may be found in i of the Constitution's virtually important safeguards against the tyranny of the mob – the formulation of federalism, or the relationship between the federal regime and united states. Madison conceived of federalism as a meaning bulwark against out-of-command pop majorities by enabling the federal government and us to check each other. Justice Louis D. Brandeis famously described the states as "laboratories of democracy," which are tinkering with—and often fighting over—providing easier (or more restrictive) access to voting, expanding (or opposing) nonpartisan primaries, pushing for (or opposing) greater transparency in campaign donations, and providing (or opposing) public funding of some campaigns.[81]
The third and near promising fashion to protect the fundamental ethics and objectives of the Madisonian Constitution is through constitutional education. The Framers believed that the fate of the commonwealth depended on educating the citizenry. President George Washington urged Congress to create a national university in 1796. He declared, "A primary object of such a national institution should be the teaching of our youth in the science of regime."[82] Drawing on his studies of ancient republics, which taught that broadly educating the citizenry was the best safeguard against "crafty and dangerous encroachments on the public liberty," Madison favored having the rich subsidize education of the poor.[83] He believed information technology was indispensable for combating factions. In defence force of the Kentucky legislature'southward "Plan of Didactics embracing every Course of Citizens," Madison wrote in 1822, "A popular authorities, without popular information, or the ways of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both."[84] Subsequently, John Quincy Adams, Henry Dirt and Abraham Lincoln were among those who dedicated the broadening and deepening of public educational activity at both the federal and local levels.
At the National Constitution Heart believe, we are committed to expanding constitutional education for all. The faithful implementation of the Madisonian Constitution depends on the ultimate sovereign, we the people, cultivating our faculties of reason by educating ourselves near the Constitution. The concept of virtue, which was important to Madison and the other Framers, required commitment to civil dialogue, to disagreeing without existence disagreeable, and to working together on behalf of the public good.
A Madisonian Constitution for All depends on the whole people'due south commitment to the enterprise of making authorities work on behalf of the public good, and that commitment requires rising to the challenges of becoming educated nearly the most pressing issues of the 24-hour interval. Madison was a partisan, but earlier that, he was a Founder, and earlier that, he was a educatee of constitutional history. Madison may not have been perfect in fulfilling the ambitions he set for himself, the land, and the Constitution. But his ambitions remain the inspiration and model for all Americans to follow in ensuring that the Constitution that Madison helped to create is more than than what he called a "parchment barrier" confronting threats to liberty and public reason. Rather, it must exist a code to live past and to inspire futurity generations to larn about every bit we strive together "to form a more perfect Wedlock."[85]
[i] James Madison, "Vices of the Political System of the Us, April. 1787," in Selected Writings of James Madison, ed. Ralph Ketcham (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2006), 35–42.
[2] James Madison, The Writings of James Madison Comprising His Public Papers and His Private Correspondence, Including Numerous Letters and Documents Now for the First Fourth dimension Printed, vol. Ii ed. Gaillard Hunt (New York: Yard.P. Putnams Sons, 1901,) 369.
[3] See more often than not, Jeffrey Rosen, "America Is Living James Madison's Nightmare," The Atlantic, October 2018, https://world wide web.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/x/james-madison-mob-rule/568351/.
[4] The Federalist No. 55 (James Madison or Alexander Hamilton).
[5] The Federalist No. 55.
[half-dozen] The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
[vii] The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
[eight] National Gazette, Dec. 19, 1791.
[9] Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 448.
[10] Register of Congress, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 449.
[11] Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 449.
[12] "Madison's Letter of the alphabet on the Constitutionality of the Bank of the U.s., June 25, 1831," in Jonathan Elliot and James Madison, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution: as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, vol. 4 (Washington: Printed for the editor, 1836), 617.
[thirteen] The Federalist No. 37 (James Madison).
[14] The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
[15] The Federalist No. 10.
[16] James Madison, "Parties," Jan. 23, 1792, in Philip B. Kurland, The Founders Constitution vol. 1 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987), fifteen.
[17] George Washington, Washington's Cheerio Accost: Delivered September 17th, 1796 (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1861).
[eighteen] James Madison, "Virginia Ratifying Convention, June xx, 1788," in The Founders' Constitution vol. ane (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987), thirteen.
[19] Madison, Virginia Ratifying Convention.
[twenty] William F. Grover, A Structural Critique of the American Presidency: The Carter and Reagan Years, Dissertation (University of Massachusetts, Sept. 1987).
[21]The Federalist No. 48.
[22] The Constitution empowers the Senate alone to give its advice and consent to presidential nominations to courts and other high-ranking positions, to captive and remove from office someone who has been impeached by the Business firm, and to ratify treaties by at to the lowest degree a two-thirds vote. Article II, Section 2, Clause two, U.South. Const.
[23] The Federalist No. 47.
[24] The Federalist No. 51.
[25] The Federalist No. 47.
[26] Sai Prakash, "From a Fixed, Limited Presidency to a Living, Flexible, Boundless Presidency," in A Madisonian Constitution for All Essay Series (Philadelphia, National Constitution Center, 2019), 2.
[27] Prakash, "From a Stock-still, Express Presidency," five.
[28] Prakash, "From a Fixed, Limited Presidency," 8.
[29] Prakash , "From a Stock-still, Limited Presidency," 13.
[30] Prakash, "From a Fixed, Limited Presidency," 17.
[31] Prakash, "From a Fixed, Express Presidency," 17.
[32] Sean Wilentz, "The Constitution, the Presidency, and Partisan Democracy: Congress Revises the Balloter College, 1804," in A Madisonian Constitution for All Essay Series (Philadelphia, National Constitution Heart, 2019), 2.
[33] Wilentz, "The Constitution, the Presidency, and Partisan Democracy," two.
[34] Wilentz, "The Constitution, the Presidency, and Partisan Democracy," 11.
[35] Sarah Binder, "Revisiting and Restoring Madison'southward American Congress," in A Madisonian Constitution for All Essay Serial (Philadelphia, National Constitution Center, 2019), 2.
[36] Binder, "Revisiting and Restoring Madison's American Congress," ii.
[37] Binder, "Revisiting and Restoring Madison's American Congress," ii.
[38] Binder, "Revisiting and Restoring Madison's American Congress," vii.
[39] Binder, "Revisiting and Restoring Madison'southward American Congress," 7.
[40] Binder, "Revisiting and Restoring Madison's American Congress," 8.
[41] Binder, "Revisiting and Restoring Madison's American Congress," 8.
[42] Binder, "Revisiting and Restoring Madison's American Congress," ten.
[43] Binder, "Revisiting and Restoring Madison's American Congress," 13.
[44] Daniel Stid, "Recovering a Madisonian Congress," in A Madisonian Constitution for All Essay Series (Philadelphia, National Constitution Centre, 2019), 12.
[45] Stid, "Recovering a Madisonian Congress," iv.
[46] Stid, "Recovering a Madisonian Congress," 6.
[47] Stid, "Recovering a Madisonian Congress," vi.
[48] Stid, "Recovering a Madisonian Congress," xi.
[49] Stid, "Recovering a Madisonian Congress," 8.
[fifty] Stid, "Recovering a Madisonian Congress," eleven.
[51] Stid, "Recovering a Madisonian Congress," 12.
[52] Stid, "Recovering a Madisonian Congress," 14.
[53] Stid, "Recovering a Madisonian Congress," 14.
[54] Jack Rakove, "James Madison and the Judicial Ability," in A Madisonian Constitution for All Essay Series (Philadelphia, National Constitution Center, 2019), 2.
[55] Rakove, "James Madison and the Judicial Ability," seven.
[56] Rakove, "James Madison and the Judicial Power," 7.
[57] Rakove, "James Madison and the Judicial Power," 13.
[58] Michael Stokes Paulsen, "James Madison and the Power of Ramble Interpretation," in A Madisonian Constitution for All Essay Series (Philadelphia, National Constitution Center, 2019), two.
[59] Paulsen, "James Madison and the Power of Constitutional Interpretation," 3.
[60] Paulsen, "James Madison and the Ability of Constitutional Interpretation," 4.
[61] Paulsen, "James Madison and the Power of Ramble Estimation," vi.
[62] Paulsen, "James Madison and the Power of Constitutional Estimation," 7.
[63] Paulsen, "James Madison and the Power of Constitutional Interpretation," 13.
[64] Paulsen, "James Madison and the Power of Constitutional Estimation," xv.
[65] Colleen Sheehan, "Madison'south Deliberative Republicanism, Political Communication, & the Sovereignty of Public Stance," in A Madisonian Constitution for All Essay Series (Philadelphia, National Constitution Middle, 2019), iv.
[66] Sheehan, "Madison'southward Deliberative Republicanism," 4.
[67] Sheehan, "Madison'southward Deliberative Republicanism," 4.
[68] Sheehan, "Madison's Deliberative Republicanism," five.
[69] Sheehan, "Madison's Deliberative Republicanism," 5.
[70] Sheehan, "Madison'south Deliberative Republicanism," v.
[71] Sheehan, "Madison's Deliberative Republicanism," 5.
[72] Sheehan, "Madison'southward Deliberative Republicanism," 5.
[73] Sheehan, "Madison's Deliberative Republicanism," 10.
[74] Sheehan, "Madison'southward Deliberative Republicanism," eleven.
[75] Greg Weiner, "'The Ultimate Justice of the People' Madison, Public Opinion and the Internet Age," in A Madisonian Constitution for All Essay Series (Philadelphia, National Constitution Center, 2019), two.
[76] Weiner, "'The Ultimate Justice of the People,'" iii.
[77] Weiner, "'The Ultimate Justice of the People,'" 2.
[78] Weiner, "'The Ultimate Justice of the People,'" 2.
[79] Weiner, "'The Ultimate Justice of the People,'" 8.
[80] Weiner, "'The Ultimate Justice of the People,'" 9.
[81] New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
[82] George Washington, 8th Annual Bulletin, Dec. vii, 1796.
[83] Niles' National Register, vol. 23, 377.
[84] Niles' National Register, vol. 23, 376-377.
[85] Preamble, U.S. Const.
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